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removing the property from the real
estate market. However, the court
noted that it is still the prerogative of
the parties to establish a new
financing condition or to extend a
financing condition. Nevertheless,
such amendments or extensions
should be "express and not left to
implication from extension of the
date of performance of the contract."

Buyer didn't act in bad
faith or participate in
unfair practice

In ruling against Dr.
Hobbie, however, the appellate court
found that he had not acted in bad
faith. The court dismissed an unfair
practice claim against Dr. Hobbie,
arguing that he was "untutored in
the perils of the modem real estate
transaction, and unaware of the
potential difficulties that might arise
from even the possibility of toxic
pollution" on the property. "Ineptitude there may have been; bad faith
and unfair practice there was not.
Not every unlawful act is automati-

cally an unfair (or deceptive) one
under M.G.L.A. 93A §1."
This ruling reinforces a
well-grounded legal principle that
consumers in the real estate market
would be wise to heed: Assumption
is the mother of all mishaps, and the
home of true security in is found the
written document.

Allstate prevails in suit over exclusionary clauses
for uninsured motorist coverage
by Aaron R. Pettit

In Luechtefeld v. Allstate Ins. Co., 656 N.E.2d
Allstate denied the claim, citing an exclusion1058 (I11. 1995), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
ary clause in the policy excluding uninsured-motorist
an exclusionary clause denying uninsured-motorist
coverage for vehicles the insured owned which had
coverage for vehicles owned by the insured, when such
uninsured-motorist coverage under another policy.
vehicles have uninsured-motorist coverage under
Allstate argued that this clause clearly excluded coveranother insurance policy, did not violate public policy.
age for the plaintiff's motorcycle accident because the
Perkin policy covered the motorcycle.
On December 10, 1990, the plaintiff, Harry
The plaintiff then brought a declaratory
Luechtefeld ("the plaintiff'), suffered personal injuries
when the motorcycle he was driving was struck by an
judgment action in the circuit court of St. Clair County,
uninsured motorist. The motorcycle was insured under a seeking a determination of his rights under the Allstate
policy. He claimed the exclusionary clause was ambigupolicy issued by Pekin Insurance Company ("Perkin"),
which provided uninsured motorist coverage with limits
ous and should therefore be construed against Allstate.
In addition, he asserted that the clause should be
of $20,000 per person. The plaintiff was also the named
unenforceable because it violated public policy. The trial
insured in a policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") to cover three automobiles the plaintiff court granted Allstate's motion for summary judgment,
finding that the policy unambiguously excluded the
owned. Since the plaintiff's damages exceeded the
plaintiffs claim. The appellate court reversed, finding
$20,000 limit on the Pekin policy, the plaintiff filed a
that the exclusion was invalid for public policy reasons
claim with Allstate, claiming that his injuries were
the clause was unambiguous.
covered under the uninsured-motorist provisions of the
The Illinois Supreme Court first rejected the
Allstate policy.
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plaintiff's argument that the clause was ambiguous and
found that the clause clearly excluded uninsuredmotorist coverage for injuries sustained in a vehicle
insured under another policy.

Uninsured-motorist coverage
In determining whether the clause violated the
public policy of the state, the court looked to § 143a of
the Illinois Insurance Code, 215 ILCS 5/143a (1992).
Section 143a provides that every liability insurance
policy in Illinois must provide coverage for injury or
death caused by an uninsured vehicle. Allstate argued
that the exclusion did not violate the policy underlying §
143a because the clause did not take effect unless the
insured had uninsured-motorist coverage under another
policy. The court agreed with Allstate's argument, stating
that the Illinois Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the purpose of § 143a is to place the insured
in the same position he would occupy if the uninsured
driver had been minimally insured. The court said the
exclusionary clause did not defeat the purpose of § 143a
because the clause only takes effect if the insured has
coverage under another policy. Since the plaintiff had
coverage under the Pekin policy, he was put in the same
position as if the uninsured driver had been minimally
insured.

Public policy argument
The plaintiff further argued that the exclusionary clause was invalid under the reasoning expressed in
Squire v. Economy Fire& Casualty Co., 69 Iil. 2d 167
(1977). In Squire, the insurance policy excluded
uninsured-motorist coverage for vehicles not listed in
the policy. The court held that this clause violated the
public policy embodied in § 143a because it could leave
a person unprotected for accidents with uninsured
motorists. The plaintiff contends this holding meant that
when an insured purchases an insurance policy which
includes uninsured-motorist coverage, the policy
provides such coverage for any vehicle the insured
owns, even if the vehicle is insured under another policy.
The court rejected the plaintiff's interpretation
of Squire and made a distinction between the policy in
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Squire and the Allstate policy. In Squire, the policy
excluded uninsured-motorist coverage whenever the
insured was injured in a vehicle not listed in the policy,
whether the injured party it was insured under another
policy. The exclusionary clause in the Allstate policy, on
the other hand, excluded coverage only if another policy
covered the vehicle. Thus, the court concluded, enforcement of the exclusionary clause in the Allstate policy
would never leave an insured without coverage, whereas
the clause in the Squire case could have left an insured
without uninsured-motorist coverage in violation of §
143a.
The plaintiff also argued that the exclusionary
clause violated public policy because it punished him for
buying the second policy from Pekin. The plaintiff
asserted that had he never purchased the second policy,
the Allstate policy would have provided coverage.
Therefore, he gained nothing in purchasing the Pekin
policy. The court rejected this argument for two reasons.
First, the court stated that the plaintiff did receive
valuable consideration for the Pekin policy in the
liability coverage for his motorcycle. Second, the court
stated that the plaintiff's argument was unpersuasive
because he was asking the court to address a scenario
not present in the case. The court said that its place was
not to predict the outcome of the case had the plaintiff
not purchased the second policy.
Additionally, the court addressed the reasoning
underlying the appellate court's holding that the clause
violated public policy. The appellate court based its
holding on the belief that the clause should be declared
invalid to encourage consumers to purchase increased
uninsured-motorist protection. The court emphasized
that the purpose of the uninsured-motorist statute was
not to encourage the purchase of maximum uninsuredmotorist coverage, but to ensure that a motorist injured
by an uninsured driver be left in as good a position as he
would have been in if the uninsured motorist had
insurance. Further, the court stated that invalidating the
exclusionary clause would not accomplish the result the
appellate court sought, but would, on the other hand,
encourage consumers to purchase adequate uninsuredmotorist protection for one automobile and minimal or
no coverage for all other automobiles.
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Repugnant to system of justice
Finally, the court stated that the relief the
plaintiff sought was contrary to public policy considerations previously recognized by the Supreme Court of
Illinois. The plaintiff insured his motorcycle for only
$25,000 per person. Thus, if the motorcycle was
involved in an accident in which the plaintiff was at
fault, the injured party would only be able to recover
$25,000. In this case, the plaintiff attempted to recover
more benefits for himself than he elected to make

available to third parties whom he injured. The Supreme Court of Illinois previously stated that this
outcome would be repugnant to the system of justice.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that the clause unambiguously prohibited
the plaintiff from seeking uninsured-motorist coverage
from Allstate and that enforcement of this clause did
not violate public policy. Accordingly, the judgment of
the appellate court was reversed, and the judgment of
the circuit court was affirmed.

A muppet will not be confused with lunchmeat
by Tisha Pates Underwood
Muppet fans can take
comfort in knowing that the latest
addition to the muppet family-a
wild boar named Spa'am-is not
overly confusing with the lunchmeat
SPAM. This issue was recently the
center of a legal controversy when
Jim Henson Productions ("Henson")
intended to include the Spa'am
muppet in its latest movie "Treasure
Island" and portray Spa'am on
merchandise. Before releasing the
movie and merchandise, Hormel
Foods Corp. ('Hormel"), the maker
of SPAM, filed suit in the U.S.
District Court of the Southern
District of New York. Hormel
alleged that the proposed use of
Spa'am constituted 1)trademark
infringement and false advertising in
violation of the federal Lanham Act
and 2) unfair competition, deceptive
practices, and trademark dilution in
violation of New York's common
law. In Hormel Foods Corp. v.Jim
Henson Prods.Inc., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d
1812 (1995), the court found that
"Spa'am", the muppet, would not be
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confused by consumers with
"SPAM", the lunchmeat, and held
that "Spa'am" does not dilute the
"SPAM" trademark. Accordingly,
Henson did not violate either the
federal Lanham Act or New York's
trademark laws.

Trademark infringement
and false advertising
claims under the Lanham
Act rejected
Hormel alleged that
Henson's Spa'am constituted
trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)
(1988). This section prohibits the
use of a copy or colorable imitation
of another's trademark. In order to
determine whether Spa'am constituted this type of imitation, the court
needed to determine whether
consumers would mistakenly believe
that Hormel approved the use of the
SPAM trademark in the creation and
marketing of Spa'am. To do this, the
court turned to the eight factors

established in PolaroidCorp. v.
PolaradElec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492
(2d Cir. 1961). These factors
include: strength of plaintiff's mark,
similarity of uses, proximity of the
products, likelihood that the prior
owner will bridge the gap (likelihood that one of the manufacturers
will expand into the domain of the
other), actual confusion, defendant's
good or bad faith in using plaintiff's
mark, quality of the junior user's
product, and sophistication of
consumers. Furthermore, since the
Spa'am case involved a parody of
the SPAM lunchmeat, the court held
there were additional First Amendment considerations and the eight
Polaroidfactors should be applied
with proper weight given to those
considerations.
The court held that all of
the Polaroidfactors were either
inapplicable or favored Henson.
Hormel failed to show likelihood of
consumer confusion and, thus, the
existence of trademark infringement.
The court noted, "[N]o one likes to
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